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WHEN THE SAME WORDS MEAN 
DIFFERENT THINGS: VARJABEDIAN v. 
EMULEX CORP. AND THE REQUIREMENTS 
OF SECTION 14(E) OF THE EXCHANGE ACT 
Abstract: On April 20, 2018, in Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that Section 14(e) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires only a showing of negligence, not 
scienter, to establish a violation. The Ninth Circuit derived that requirement 
from the fact that Section 14(e) resembles Section 17(a)(2) of the Securities 
Act of 1933. In reaching this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit split with all the 
other courts to consider this question. The Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, and 
Eleventh Circuits had previously held that Section 14(e) shares more similari-
ties with Rule 10b-5, itself promulgated under Section 10(b) of the Exchange 
Act. Under that line of reasoning, because Rule 10b-5 actions have a scienter 
requirement, so too do Section 14(e) actions. This Comment argues that the 
majority view, that Section 14(e) more closely resembles Rule 10b-5 and thus 
requires a showing of scienter, not mere negligence, is correct. 
INTRODUCTION 
Following the financial panic of 1929, Congress enacted the Securities 
Act of 1933 (the “Securities Act”) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(the “Exchange Act”) to protect investors from misleading claims about 
stock values.1 Though the Securities Act governed the issuance of new se-
curities and the Exchange Act covered subsequent stock transactions, nei-
ther regulated cash tender offers.2 In the 1960s, large corporations took ad-
                                                                                                                           
 1 See George J. Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 132, 132 (1973) (noting that fears of mis-
leading claims in part motivated stock market reform); Carol J. Simon, The Effect of the 1933 
Securities Act on Investor Information and the Performance of New Issues, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 
295, 296 (1989) (observing that Congress passed the Securities Act to guard against false state-
ments about the value of securities); Steven Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385, 409 (1990) (showing that a strong desire for 
overhauling the laws governing the stock market existed before the 1929 financial panic). 
 2 See Christina M. Sautter, Tender Offers and Disclosure: The History and Future of the Wil-
liams Act, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 359, 359 (Claire A. Hill & 
Steven Davidoff Solomon eds., 2016) (explaining that neither the Securities Act or the Exchange 
Act regulated cash tender offers before the 1960s); Steven M. Davidoff, The SEC and the Failure 
of Federal Takeover Regulation, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 211, 215–16 (2007) (making clear that no 
laws covered cash tender offers before the 1960s); Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Misreading 
the Williams Act, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1862, 1895 (1989) (pointing to this gap in the securities law 
before the 1960s). A tender offer is an offer to purchase a large amount of equity from a compa-
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vantage of this loophole and consummated many acquisitions by making 
cash tender offers to shareholders without telling shareholders, among other 
things, whether the premium to the market price represented a fair valua-
tion.3 To remedy this problem, Congress built upon the securities regulation 
regime with the Williams Act of 1968.4 In particular, with the addition of 
Section 14(e) to the Exchange Act as part of the Williams Act, Congress 
aimed to deter fraud by requiring those involved in the cash tender offer 
process to be honest and forthright in their dealings with shareholders.5 This 
requirement of disclosure, however, did not invite courts to judge the fair-
ness of tender offers.6 In the succeeding years, courts have analogized Sec-
tion 14(e) to Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 10b-5, promul-
gated under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.7 Under this line of reason-
                                                                                                                           
ny’s shareholders. Sautter, supra, at 358–59; Johnson & Millon, supra, at 1891. See generally 
Fast Answers: Tender Offer, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Jan. 16, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/
fast-answers/answerstenderhtm.html [https://perma.cc/4743-RU2N] (providing background on 
tender offers). A tender offer is one way to carry out a hostile takeover of a company. Sautter, 
supra, at 358; Johnson & Millon, supra, at 1891. There are two types of tender offers: stock tender 
offers and cash tender offers. Sautter, supra, at 358. With a stock tender offer, the offeror gives 
stock in exchange for the equity of the target company. Id. With a cash tender offer, the offeror 
gives cash in exchange for the equity of the target company. Id. In the 1960s, cash tender offers 
had a distinct advantage over stock tender offers, as the government required registration of the 
shares to be used in a stock tender offer, thereby depriving the hostile bidder of secrecy and sur-
prise. Id. 
 3 Sautter, supra note 2, at 360–61. 
 4 See Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975) (spelling out that the purpose 
of the Williams Act is to make sure that those making cash tender offers disclose relevant facts to 
the target company’s shareholders); Johnson & Millon, supra note 2, at 1895 (demonstrating that 
Congress wished to increase disclosure with respect to cash tender offers with the Williams Act). 
 5 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (2012); see Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 24 (1977) (spec-
ifying that Section 14(e) Williams Act was targeted towards those looking to sway investors with 
tender offers); Mark J. Loewenstein, Section 14(e) of the Williams Act and the Rule 10b-5 Com-
parisons, 71 GEO. L.J. 1311, 1311 n.1 (1983) (indicating that the Williams Act represented Con-
gress’s response to the increasing use and abuse of the cash tender offer). Section 14(e) provides, 
in relevant part: 
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a material fact or 
omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in 
the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading, or to en-
gage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in connection 
with any tender offer or request or invitation for tenders, or any solicitation of secu-
rity holders in opposition to or in favor of any such offer, request, or invitation. 
15 U.S.C. § 78n(e). 
 6 Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1985) (“Nowhere in the legislative 
history is there the slightest suggestion that § 14(e) serves any purpose other than disclosure, or 
that the term ‘manipulative’ should be read as an invitation to the courts to oversee the substantive 
fairness of tender offers; the quality of any offer is a matter for the marketplace.”). 
 7 SEC v. Ginsburg, 362 F.3d 1292, 1297 (11th Cir. 2004) (analogizing Section 14(e) to Rule 
10b-5); Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, Inc., 623 F.2d 422, 429–31 (6th Cir. 1980) (discussing 
the similar purpose and requirements of Section 14(e) and Rule 10b-5 and determining that the 
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ing, because Rule 10b-5 actions have a requirement of scienter, so too do 
Section 14(e) actions.8 In this context, scienter refers to a “mental state em-
bracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.”9 Scienter differs from 
negligence in that the latter encompasses mere failure to exercise a reasona-
ble duty of care.10 
In 2018, in Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit split from the other circuits to consider the 
question and concluded that Section 14(e) resembles Section 17(a)(2) of the 
Securities Act and therefore requires only a showing of negligence, not sci-
enter.11 This Comment discusses the circuit split over the requirements of 
                                                                                                                           
legislative history shows Section 14(e) was “patterned” on Rule 10b-5); Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., v. 
Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 362 (2d Cir. 1973) (“In determining whether § 14(e) violations 
were committed in the instant case, we shall follow the principles developed under Rule 10b-5 
regarding the elements of such violations.”). Section 10(b) makes it unlawful to violate an SEC 
rule. Steven Thel, Taking Section 10(b) Seriously: Criminal Enforcement of SEC Rules, 2014 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 4–5. Together with Section 10(b), Rule 10b-5 has come to serve as the 
primary vehicle by which investors bring securities fraud class actions. Yuliya Guseva, The SEC 
and Foreign Private Issuers: A Path to Optimal Public Enforcement, 59 B.C. L. REV. 2055, 2082–
83 (2018) (explaining that Rule 10b-5 constitutes the typical weapon used by private plaintiffs in 
their class actions); Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring the 
Relationship between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule 10b-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1301, 
1302 (2008) (showing that private plaintiffs most frequently employ Rule 10b-5 in securities fraud 
class actions). Rule 10b-5(b) provides, in relevant part, “It shall be unlawful for any person . . . 
[t]o engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud 
or deceit upon any person . . . in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.” 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.10b-5 (2018). 
 8 Ginsburg, 362 F.3d at 1297; Adams, 623 F.2d at 429–31; Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 480 F.2d 
at 362. 
 9 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 n.12 (1976) (providing the definition of 
scienter). 
 10 See Comment, Negligent Misrepresentations Under Rule 10b-5, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 824, 
839 (1965) (defining negligence in the securities law context as failure to exercise a reasonable 
duty of care). 
 11 Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 406 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 2019 U.S. 
LEXIS 8 (Jan. 4, 2019) (No. 18-459) (connecting the interpretation of Section 14(e) with the in-
terpretation of Section 17(a)(2)). Section 17(a)(2) provided, in relevant part: 
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities (including 
security-based swaps) or any security-based swap agreement . . . by the use of any 
means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or 
by use of the mails, directly or indirectly . . . to obtain money or property by means 
of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under 
which they were made, not misleading. 
15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2) (2011), amended by Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protec-
tion Act, Pub. L. 111-203, § 762(b)(2) (codified as amended as 15 U.S.C. § 77q). Whereas Rule 
10b-5 prohibits fraud, Section 17(a)(2) bars theft of money or property through fraud. SEC v. 
Tambone, 597 F.3d 436, 444 (1st Cir. 2010) (specifying the difference between Rule 10b-5 and 
Section 17(a)(2)). 
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Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act.12 Part I describes the legislative history 
of the Williams Act and the facts of the Varjabedian case.13 Part II explains 
how courts have interpreted Section 14(e) and how the Ninth Circuit 
reached its conclusion.14 Part III argues that Ninth Circuit should not have 
departed from its sister circuits in making its determination.15 
I. DISCLOSURE AND THE LACK THEREOF: FROM THE  
GREAT DEPRESSION TO VARJABEDIAN 
It is difficult to understand Varjabedian without reference to the histo-
ry of the Williams Act and the peculiar facts that gave rise to the case.16 To 
that end, Section A of this Part presents the history of the Williams Act.17 
Section B introduces the facts at the heart of the Varjabedian case.18 
A. A Matter of Disclosure: The Legislative History of Securities Regulation 
During the Great Depression, Congress passed the Securities Act and 
the Exchange Act.19 The former served to protect investors during the initial 
distribution of securities and the latter governed transactions on secondary 
markets.20 Both laws were enacted based on the principle that more disclo-
sure improves market outcomes.21 Congress believed that the disclosure of 
more information would enable investors to value their holdings inde-
pendently, thereby allowing them to see through exaggerated claims about 
                                                                                                                           
 12 Compare Ginsburg, 362 F.3d at 1297 (holding that violations of Section 14(e) require a 
showing of scienter), and Adams, 623 F.2d at 431 (“The language of the Williams Act clearly 
demonstrates that Congress envisioned scienter to be an element of 14(e).”), with Varjabedian, 
888 F.3d at 407 (ruling that violations of Section 14(e) require only a showing of negligence). 
 13 See infra notes 16–45 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 46–97 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 98–128 and accompanying text. 
 16 See Varjabedian, 888 F.3d at 403 (laying out the facts of the case and a history of modern 
securities regulation).  
 17 See infra notes 19–32 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 33–45 and accompanying text. 
 19 Varjabedian, 888 F.3d at 403; see John Hanna, The Securities Exchange Act as Supplemen-
tary of the Securities Act, 4 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 256, 257 (1937) (providing background on 
and analysis of the Exchange Act). But see Thel, supra note 1, at 409 (arguing, contrary to con-
ventional beliefs, that by the time Franklin Roosevelt assumed the presidency, agreement already 
existed about the need for securities regulation). 
 20 Edward Rock, Securities Regulation as Lobster Trap: A Credible Commitment Theory of 
Mandatory Disclosure, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 675, 678 (2002) (pointing to the main difference 
between the Securities Act and the Exchange Act). 
 21 See Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 563 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) 
(making clear that disclosure underpins the entire system of securities regulation).  
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stock values.22 In the 1960s, however, large corporations began carrying out 
their acquisitions by cash tender offer.23 In making offers of this sort, 
would-be acquirers did not need to tell shareholders, among other things, 
whether the premium represented a fair valuation in comparison to the mar-
ket price.24  
To remedy these issues, Congress once again turned to disclosure.25 In 
1968, Congress passed the Williams Act.26 In particular, with the addition of 
Section 14(e) to the Exchange Act as part of the Williams Act, it aimed to 
deter fraud by requiring those involved in the cash tender offer process to be 
honest and forthright in their dealings with shareholders.27 This requirement 
of disclosure, however, was not intended to invite courts to judge the fair-
ness of tender offers.28 
In adding Section 14(e) to the Exchange Act, Congress employed fa-
miliar language.29 Section 14(e) resembles Section 17(a)(2) of the Securities 
Act as well as SEC Rule 10b-5, itself promulgated under Section 10(b) of 
the Exchange Act.30 Since 1973, courts have looked almost exclusively to 
Rule 10b-5 and its requirement of scienter for guidance in analyzing Sec-
tion 14(e).31 It was not until 2018 that the Ninth Circuit broke with its sister 
circuits and held that Section 14(e) should be analyzed in concert with Sec-
tion 17(a)(2) and its requirement of negligence.32 
                                                                                                                           
 22 See Benston, supra note 1, at 132 (asserting that a belief about bankers’ and brokers’ chi-
canery drove securities regulation reform efforts after the Great Depression); Simon, supra note 1, 
at 296 (noting that a fear of inadequate disclosure in part motivated the Securities Act). 
 23 Sautter, supra note 2, at 354; see Davidoff, supra note 2, at 215 (showing how mergers and 
acquisitions activity picked up in that period). 
 24 Sautter, supra note 2, at 359–61. In this period, individual investors predominated, and had 
to determine for themselves the intentions and calculations behind a cash tender offer. Id. 
 25 Johnson & Millon, supra note 2, at 1895. 
 26 See Rondeau, 422 U.S. at 58 (observing that the Williams Act aims to provide investors 
with information about tender offers); Johnson & Millon, supra note 2, at 1895 (maintaining that 
the Williams Act represented an extension of the disclosure regime). 
 27 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e); Piper, 430 U.S. at 24. 
 28 Schreiber, 472 U.S. at 11–12 (“Nowhere in the legislative history is there the slightest 
suggestion that § 14(e) serves any purpose other than disclosure, or that the term ‘manipulative’ 
should be read as an invitation to the courts to oversee the substantive fairness of tender offers; the 
quality of any offer is a matter for the marketplace.”). 
 29 Loewenstein, supra note 5, at 1312–13. 
 30 Id. at 1313. To further complicate matters, the language of Rule 10b-5 came from Section 
17. See Samuel W. Buell, What Is Securities Fraud?, 61 DUKE L.J. 511, 541 (2011) (pointing to 
this quirk in securities law regulation). 
 31 Ginsburg, 362 F.3d at 1297; Adams, 623 F.2d at 431; Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 480 F.2d at 
362. 
 32 Varjabedian, 888 F.3d at 406. 
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B. A Premium Offer? The Dispute at the Heart of Varjabedian 
On February 25, 2015 two technology companies, Emulex and Avago, 
announced their merger agreement.33 Under the terms of the agreement, Ava-
go would pay $8.00 for each share of Emulex stock.34 That amount represent-
ed a 26.4% premium, as the day before Emulex was trading at roughly $6.32 
a share.35 Per the agreement, an Avago subsidiary made a tender offer on 
April 7, 2015.36 In accordance with federal securities regulations, Emulex 
released a statement informing its shareholders about the appropriate course 
of action to take with regards to the outstanding offer.37 In recommending that 
its shareholders accept the offer from Avago’s subsidiary, Emulex omitted one 
analysis produced by its financial advisor, Goldman Sachs.38 In that analysis, 
Goldman Sachs found that, when compared to seventeen semiconductor 
transactions between 2010 and 2014, the 26.4% premium fell below the 
mean, although it was within the range of normal prices.39 Consistent with 
management’s recommendation, Emulex’s shareholders blessed the transac-
tion.40 
Subsequently, shareholders sued the company, its board of directors, 
and the entities acquiring it on the ground that they had accepted the tender 
offer under false pretenses.41 The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants had 
violated Section 14(e) by not including Goldman Sachs’s analysis.42 The 
United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed 
the complaint, following the lead of every circuit court to have considered 
the issue, all of which had held that scienter is a necessary element of a Sec-
tion 14(e) violation.43 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that negligence 
alone would suffice for Section 14(e) violations.44 The Supreme Court 
granted the defendants’ petition for writ of certiorari on January 4, 2019.45 
                                                                                                                           
 33 Id. at 401. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. at 402. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. at 402–03. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. at 403. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. at 408. 
 45 Emulex Corp. v. Varjabedian, 2019 U.S. LEXIS 8, at *8 (Jan. 4, 2019) (granting the peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari). 
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II. WHEN THE SAME WORDS MEAN DIFFERENT THINGS: THE BATTLE  
OVER SECTION 14(E) INTERPRETATION 
Faced with the history and facts laid out above, the Ninth Circuit chal-
lenged the traditional consensus about the interpretation of Section 14(e).46 
To this end, Section A of this Part introduces the history of Section 14(e) 
jurisprudence and shows how this consensus came to be.47 Section B ex-
plains how the Ninth Circuit used this history to reach its conclusion in Var-
jabedian.48 
A. Blurred Lines: The History of Section 14(e) Jurisprudence 
Since the passage of the Williams Act, courts have looked almost ex-
clusively to Rule 10b-5 for guidance in interpreting Section 14(e).49 Indeed, 
it did not take long for scholars to notice the increasingly blurred lines be-
tween the statute and the regulation.50 The analogizing between Section 
14(e) and Rule 10b-5 began in 1973 when, in Chris-Craft Industries v. Pip-
er Aircraft Corp., the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
noted that in the absence of precedent construing Section 14(e), Rule 10b-5 
provided the best guidance due to its “virtually identical” prohibition.51 As 
the court made clear, its prior decisions had shown that negligence did not 
satisfy the so-called “scienter” requirement of Rule 10b-5.52 Though the 
court did not define scienter, it suggested that knowledge or recklessness 
might suffice.53  
 Other courts had reached different conclusions about the culpability 
requirements of the regulation.54 For instance, although the Ninth Circuit 
                                                                                                                           
 46 See Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 406 (9th Cir. 2018) (pointing to problems 
with the traditional understanding of Section 14(e)).  
 47 See infra notes 49–82 and accompanying text. 
 48 See infra notes 83–97 and accompanying text. 
 49 See, e.g., SEC v. Ginsburg, 362 F.3d 1292, 1297 (11th Cir. 2004) (analogizing Section 
14(e) to Rule 10b-5); Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, Inc., 623 F.2d 422, 431 (6th Cir. 1980) 
(same); Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 362 (2d Cir. 1973) (same). 
 50 See, e.g., Loewenstein, supra note 5, at 1356 (noting that in the view of the courts, no dis-
tinction exists between Section 14(e) and Rule 10b-5). 
 51 Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 480 F.2d at 362. 
 52 Id. at 363. 
 53 See id. (not offering a definition of the term “scienter”). 
 54 Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 734–35 (8th Cir. 1967) (holding that a showing of scienter 
is not necessary to establish a Rule 10b-5 violation); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 637 (7th 
Cir. 1963) (same); see Bruce Alan Mann, Rule 10b-5: Evolution of a Continuum of Conduct to 
Replace the Catch Phrases of Negligence and Scienter, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1206, 1206 (1970) 
(pointing to the controversy over the requirements of Rule 10b-5); James R. McGuirk & Peter E. 
Moll, Comment, Lanza v. Drexel & Co. and Rule 10b-5: Approaching the Scienter Controversy in 
Private Actions, 15 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 526, 529 (1974) (discussing the ongoing debate 
about the requirements of Rule 10b-5). 
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had not arrived at a clear standard for Rule 10b-5, it had expressed openness 
to eliminating the scienter requirement.55 This diversity of opinion among 
the circuits began to disappear after the Second Circuit’s Chris-Craft Indus-
tries decision.56 In 1974, in Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit aligned with the Second Circuit 
in holding that scienter represented an element of both Section 14(e) and 
Rule 10b-5 violations.57  
Two years later, in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, the Supreme Court 
provided more clarity about the requirements of Rule 10b-5.58 In ruling that 
violations of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 required scienter, the Court of-
fered another definition of the term.59 Writing for the majority, Justice Pow-
ell made clear that scienter referred to a “mental state embracing intent to 
deceive, manipulate, or defraud.”60 In the Court’s view, the language of 
Rule 10b-5 did not expressly require this type of intentional wrongdoing.61 
Rule 10b-5, however, implicitly targeted acts carried out with this mental 
state, because Section 10(b) of the authorizing statute spoke of manipula-
tion and deception.62  
Justice Powell also provided a definition of one of the terms used in 
Section 14(e).63 Section 14(e) specifically prohibits “fraudulent, deceptive 
or manipulative acts or practices.”64 The word “manipulative” in Section 
10(b), Justice Powell explained, suggests “intentional or willful conduct 
designed to deceive or defraud investors by controlling or artificially affect-
                                                                                                                           
 55 Alan J. Ross & James F. Sealler, Note, Scienter and Rule 10b-5: Development of a New 
Standard..., 23 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 493, 510 (1974) (demonstrating the wide range of positions 
taken by the Ninth Circuit in this debate). 
 56 See, e.g., Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 605 (5th Cir. 1974) (noting that 
scienter is an element of Section 14(e) violations). 
 57 Id. Although the Fifth Circuit agreed with Judge Timber’s analysis, it recognized the ongo-
ing debate about whether negligence or some higher form of culpability represented the appropri-
ate standard. Id. at 606. 
 58 See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 212 (1976) (holding that Rule 10b-5 re-
quires a showing of scienter). 
 59 Id. at 194 n.12. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. at 212. Most importantly, Justice Powell wrote that the language of Rule 10b-5 “could 
be read as proscribing, respectively, any type of material misstatement or omission, and any 
course of conduct, that has the effect of defrauding investors, whether the wrongdoing was inten-
tional or not.” Id. 
 62 Id. at 214; Varjabedian, 888 F.3d at 406; see also Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 
462, 473 (1977) (“The language of § 10(b) [sic] gives no indication that Congress meant to pro-
hibit any conduct not involving manipulation or deception.”). 
 63 Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 199; see Adams, 623 F.2d at 431 (indicating the relevance of 
Ernst & Ernst and its analysis of the word “manipulative” to the interpretation of Section 14(e)).  
 64 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (2012); Adams, 623 F.2d at 431. 
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ing the price of securities.”65 Negligent conduct, in other words, would not 
give rise to a Section 10(b) violation.66 Nevertheless, Justice Powell did not 
specify whether any correspondence existed between manipulative conduct 
and conduct carried out with scienter.67 Although manipulative conduct 
seemed to share many of the same attributes as conduct carried out with 
scienter, it was unclear where the former ended and the latter began.68 
Despite this uncertainty, a consensus soon began to emerge, a consen-
sus based on the idea that scienter is a necessary element of both Section 
14(e) and Rule 10b-5 actions.69 In 1980, in Adams v. Standard Knitting 
Mills, Inc., the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that 
both Rule 10b-5 and Section 14(e) require a showing of scienter.70 A month 
later, in Aaron v. SEC, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its ruling that viola-
tions of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 required scienter.71 At the same time, 
the Court made clear that Section 17(a)(2) of the Securities Act requires 
only a showing of negligence.72 
In 1985, in Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., the Supreme Court 
spelled out even more explicitly the requirements of Section 14(e).73 Con-
gress, the Court noted, looked to the antifraud prohibitions of Section 10(b) 
of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 in fashioning Section 14(e)’s sweeping 
antifraud provision.74 That is to say, Section 14(e) had much in common 
with Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.75 In addition, the Supreme Court con-
strued Section 14(e) in light of Justice Powell’s analysis of the word “ma-
nipulative” in Ernst & Ernst.76 Section 14(e), in other words, targeted inten-
                                                                                                                           
 65 Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 199; Adams, 623 F.2d at 431 (noting the importance of the Ernst 
& Ernst ruling to understanding Section 14(e)). 
 66 Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 199.  
 67 Id. That being said, some courts have interpreted Ernst & Ernst to mean that the use of the 
word “manipulative” by Congress automatically implies scienter. See, e.g., Adams, 623 F.2d at 
431 (declaring that the court has an obligation to find scienter when Congress employs the word 
“manipulative” in conjunction with “fraudulent” and deceptive”). 
 68 See Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 199 (holding that the use of the word “manipulative” im-
plies intentionality, but not necessarily scienter).  
 69 See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 691 (1980) (holding that violations of Section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5 require a showing of scienter); Adams, 623 F.2d at 428 (ruling that scienter is a neces-
sary element of both Rule 10b-5 and Section 14(e) violations).  
 70 Adams, 623 F.2d at 428–31. 
 71 Aaron, 446 U.S. at 691. 
 72 Id. at 697; Varjabedian, 888 F.3d at 406. 
 73 See Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 10 (1985) (specifying the parallels be-
tween Rule 10b-5 and Section 14(e)). 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. at 6. 
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tional conduct, not the failure to exercise a reasonable duty of care.77 Fur-
thermore, the Court found it significant that the word “manipulative” fol-
lows “fraudulent” and “deceptive” in Section 14(e).78 In the eyes of the Su-
preme Court, this grouping indicated that the first two adjectives meant 
much the same as the last.79 That is to say, these three adjectives together 
provided further support for the idea that Congress intended Section 14(e) 
to apply to intentional conduct, not mere negligence.80 Section 14(e) there-
after became synonymous with Rule 10b-5.81 This remained the state of law 
until 2018, when the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
broke with its sister circuits.82 
B. Dead Precedents? The Ninth Circuit’s Approach to Section 14(e) 
In finding that scienter was not an element of Section 14(e) violations, 
the Ninth Circuit looked to Ernst & Ernst and Aaron.83 For the Ninth Cir-
cuit, those cases demonstrated that Section 14(e) required a showing of 
mere negligence, because the Supreme Court’s decisions seemed to indicate 
as much.84 Only after showing that Section 14(e) could be subject to this 
different interpretation, did the Ninth Circuit address the legislative history 
of the statutory provision and the powers it grants the SEC.85 The court be-
gan its analysis by noting that analogizing Section 14(e) to Rule 10b-5 be-
                                                                                                                           
 77 See id. (stressing the fact that “manipulative” connotes intentionality or willfulness); Ernst 
& Ernst, 425 U.S. at 199 (specifically excluding negligent conduct from the definition of “manip-
ulative”). 
 78 Schreiber, 472 U.S. at 8. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. (rooting the interpretation of “manipulative” and the associated adjectives in Ernst & 
Ernst); Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 199 (specifically excluding negligent conduct from the defini-
tion of “manipulative”); Adams, 623 F.2d at 431 (adopting precisely that interpretation of Section 
14(e) and therefore finding scienter to be a necessary element of any action brought under the 
statutory provision).  
 81 See, e.g., Flaherty & Crumrine Preferred Income Fund, Inc. v. TXU Corp. (TXU Corp.), 
565 F.3d 200, 207 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that violations of Section 14(e) and Rule 10b-5 have 
the same elements); SEC v. Ginsburg, 362 F.3d 1292, 1297 (11th Cir. 2004) (same); In re Digital 
Island Sec. Litig., 357 F.3d 322, 328 (3d Cir. 2004) (same). Most commentators did not find the 
Court’s interpretation of Section 17(a)(2) in Aaron relevant to the understanding of Section 14(e). 
Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 697 (1980); see, e.g., James C. Wine, Private Litigation Under the 
Williams Act: Standing to Sue, Elements of a Claim and Remedies, 7 J. CORP. L. 545, 546 (1982) 
(noting parallels between Section 14(e) and Rule 10b-5). But see Loewenstein, supra note 5, at 
1331 (pointing to the seeming inconsistency in the Supreme Court’s decisions). 
 82 Varjabedian, 888 F.3d at 405. 
 83 Id. at 406. 
 84 See id. at 406–07 (first citing Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 212–14; then citing Aaron, 446 
U.S. 680, 696–97; then citing Chris-Craft, 480 F.2d at 359; and then citing Smallwood, 489 F.2d 
at 605) (indicating the inconsistency between the Supreme Court’s decisions in Ernst & Ernst and 
Aaron and the appeals court decisions in Chris-Craft and Smallwood). 
 85 Id. at 407–08. 
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gan with Chris-Craft Industries in 1973.86 The court then turned its focus to 
the Fifth Circuit’s agreement with the Second Circuit in Smallwood the fol-
lowing year.87 
Following this survey of the legal landscape up to 1976, the Ninth Cir-
cuit took issue with the consensus view of Section 14(e).88 The court articu-
lated the view that Justice Powell had made clear in Ernst & Ernst that the 
language of Rule 10b-5 did not expressly require a violating act to be car-
ried out with scienter.89 The requirement of scienter, the Ninth Circuit em-
phasized, came from the fact that Section 10(b) of the authorizing statute 
spoke of manipulation and deception.90 The Ninth Circuit did not end its 
analysis there.91 In 1980, in Aaron, the Supreme Court had observed that 
Section 17(a)(2) of the Securities Act, itself similar in language to Section 
14(e), requires only a showing of negligence.92 For the Ninth Circuit, this 
amounted to further proof that Chris-Craft Industries and Smallwood need-
ed reconsideration.93 
The legislative history of Section 14(e) and the powers it grants the 
SEC reinforced this idea.94 The statutory provision, the court observed, em-
powered the SEC to police non-fraudulent conduct as long as the mecha-
nism was tailored to fraudulent acts.95 Given that Section 14(e) allows the 
SEC to reach non-fraudulent acts not requiring scienter, it follows that neg-
ligent conduct falls within the agency’s purview.96 Beyond that, the disclo-
sure rules of the Williams Act reflected a concern with the quality of infor-
mation about tender offers, not the mental state of would-be acquirers.97 
                                                                                                                           
 86 Id. at 405. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. at 405–06. 
 89 Id.  
 90 Id. at 406. 
 91 Id. at 407. The Ninth Circuit also criticized the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits for finding that 
Section 14(e) requires a showing of scienter. Id. 
 92 Id. at 406. 
 93 Id. 
 94 See id. at 407–08 (arguing that text of Section 14(e) empowers the SEC to reach non-
fraudulent conduct not requiring scienter and that, in drafting this provision, Congress cared more 
about failure to disclose than the intentions of an individual involved in the tender offer process). 
 95 Id. at 407. 
 96 Id. The Ninth Circuit makes an excellent point here, as the SEC has endorsed a very similar 
interpretation. See WHX Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 47,980, 80 SEC Docket 1153 (June 4, 
2003) (noting that Section 14(e) authorizes the SEC to “promulgate rules to regulate non-
fraudulent activity, without regard to state of mind, as a means of preventing fraudulent, deceptive 
or manipulative acts”). 
 97 Varjabedian, 888 F.3d at 408. 
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III. WHY THE SAME WORDS SHOULD MEAN DIFFERENT THINGS:  
THE UNDERLYING POLICY AND TEXT OF SECTION 14(E)  
SUPPORT A SCIENTER REQUIREMENT 
In Varjabedian, the Ninth Circuit ascribed too much importance to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Aaron.98 Although Section 14(e) and Section 
17(a)(2) have almost identical language, the same words do not necessarily 
mean the same thing.99 The text and history of Section 14(e) strongly sug-
gests that Section 14(e) necessitates a showing above mere negligence.100 
The Supreme Court has held that the text of Section 14(e) speaks of in-
tentional acts, not merely negligent conduct.101 The provision specifically 
targets “fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative acts or practices.”102 As the 
Court made clear in Ernst & Ernst, the word “manipulative” in particular im-
plies “intentional or willful conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors 
by controlling or artificially affecting the price of securities.”103 In Ernst & 
Ernst, the Supreme Court specified that negligent conduct in particular would 
not fit this definition.104 Beyond that, the fact that the word “manipulative” 
follows “fraudulent” and “deceptive” indicates that the first two adjectives 
mean much the same as the last.105 In short, these three adjectives together 
make it clear that Congress intended Section 14(e) to apply to intentional 
                                                                                                                           
 98 See Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399, 406 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Aaron v. SEC, 
446 U.S. 680, 696 (1980)) (emphasizing that in light of the similarities in language between Sec-
tion 14(e) and Section 17(a)(2), the holding in Aaron that Section 17(a)(2) requires a showing of 
negligence applies to Section 14(e)). But see Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 6–10 
(1985) (indicating the parallels between Section 14(e) and Rule 10b-5, and making clear that both 
target intentional conduct). 
 99 See Schreiber, 472 U.S. at 6–10 (noting that Section 14(e) not only resembles Section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5 but also targets intentional conduct); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 
199 (1976) (observing that the word “manipulative” in the securities law context connotes inten-
tional conduct); Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, Inc., 623 F.2d 422, 431 (6th Cir. 1980) (point-
ing to the relevance of Ernst & Ernst for understanding the meaning of the word “manipulative” in 
Section 14(e)). 
 100 See Schreiber, 472 U.S. at 6–10 (relying on the similarity between Section 14(e), Section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to find that Congress intended Section 14(e) to apply to intentional or willful 
conduct); Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 199 (“Use of the word ‘manipulative’ . . . connotes intention-
al or willful conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors by controlling or artificially affect-
ing the price of securities.”); Adams, 623 F.2d at 431 (looking to Ernst & Ernst to find that the 
word “manipulative” in Section 14(e) requires more than mere negligence for imposing liability). 
 101 Schreiber, 472 U.S. at 6–10; Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 199; Adams, 623 F.2d at 431. 
 102 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (2012). 
 103 Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 199; Adams, 623 F.2d at 431. 
 104 Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 199.  
 105 See Schreiber, 472 U.S. at 8 (pointing out this principle of statutory construction); Adams, 
623 F.2d at 431 (using this principle to find a requirement of scienter in the language of Section 
14(e)).  
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conduct, not mere negligence.106 Indeed, in 1985, in Schreiber, the nation’s 
highest court endorsed this exact construction of Section 14(e).107 
Even if one sets aside the prohibition against “fraudulent, deceptive or 
manipulative acts or practices,” Section 14(e) still appears to support a re-
quirement of scienter.108 On every occasion where the Supreme Court has 
considered the nearly identical language of Rule 10b-5, it has consistently 
stated that the entire provision requires a showing of scienter.109 
Beyond that, the Court has been explicit about the textual parallels be-
tween Rule 10b-5 and Section 14(e).110 Congress, the Supreme Court has 
noted, looked to the antifraud prohibitions of Section 10(b) of the Exchange 
Act and Rule 10b-5 in fashioning Section 14(e)’s sweeping antifraud provi-
sion.111 Under that line of precedent, comparing Section 14(e) of the Ex-
change Act to Section 17(a)(2) of the Securities Act, although tempting, 
would be inapt.112 
These textual considerations seem to suggest that Aaron does not call 
for a reconsideration of the settled understanding of Section 14(e).113 In Aa-
ron, the Court held that violations of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 require a 
showing of scienter.114 The Supreme Court, however, also ruled that negli-
gent conduct would fall within the ambit of Section 17(a)(2).115 Given that 
the Supreme Court has construed Section 14(e) to require a showing of sci-
enter, consistently noted the intentional conduct targeted by Rule 10b-5, and 
                                                                                                                           
 106 See Schreiber, 472 U.S. at 8 (indicating that the “deceptive” and “fraudulent” mean much 
the same as “manipulative”); Adams, 623 F.2d at 431 (employing this tool of statutory interpreta-
tion to find a requirement of scienter in the language of Section 14(e)). 
 107 Schreiber, 472 U.S. at 6–8. 
 108 See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (prohibiting omissions and untrue statements in the tender offer 
process); Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 156–57 (2008) 
(noting that scienter represents an element of Rule 10b-5 actions); Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & 
Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 318–19 (2007) (same); Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 
341 (2005) (same). 
 109 Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC, 552 U.S. at 156–57; Tellabs, Inc., 551 U.S. at 318–19; 
Dura Pharm., Inc., 544 U.S. at 341; see United States v. Bonds, 784 F.3d 582, 593 (9th Cir. 2015) 
(stating that it is necessary to look at the company a word keeps to divine its meaning in context). 
 110 See Schreiber, 472 U.S. at 10 (specifying the parallels between Section 14(e) and Section 
10(b) as well as Rule 10b-5). 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. 
 113 See id. at 6–10 (noting that Section 14(e) targets intentional conduct and is similar to Sec-
tion 10(b) and Rule 10b-5); Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 199 (observing that the word “manipula-
tive” in the securities law context connotes intentional conduct); Adams, 623 F.2d at 431 (pointing 
to Ernst & Ernst for understanding the meaning of the word “manipulative” in Section 14(e) and 
its requirements for liability). 
 114 Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 691 (1980). 
 115 Id. at 697. 
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analogized the statutory provision to the regulation, comparisons to Section 
17(a) seem inappropriate.116 
Moreover, the fact that disclosure underpins Section 14(e) gives no in-
dication as to the mental state or conduct targeted.117 All federal securities 
regulation relies in one way or another on the disclosure of material infor-
mation to protect shareholders.118 For some of these rules, negligent con-
duct will suffice to establish a violation.119 For others, a showing of some 
sort of willfulness is necessary.120 Consequently, the Act’s use of disclosure 
does not tip the scales in favor of negligence.121 
                                                                                                                           
 116 See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC, 552 U.S. at 156–57 (noting that Rule 10b-5 actions 
have a requirement of scienter); Tellabs, Inc., 551 U.S. at 318–19 (same); Dura Pharm., Inc., 544 
U.S. at 341 (same); Schreiber, 472 U.S. at 6–10 (observing that Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 
served as the model for Section 14(e), and that Section 14(e) focuses on intentional conduct). In 
addition, whereas the language of Section 14(e) and Rule 10b-5 focuses on the mindset of the 
defendant, that of Sections 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3) focuses on the conduct of the defendant. See 15 
U.S.C. § 78n(e) (forbidding fraud); id. § 78q(a)(2)–(3) (prohibiting the theft of money or property 
through fraud); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2018) (proscribing fraud). 
 117 See Johnson & Millon, supra note 2, at 1895 (observing the ubiquity of disclosure re-
quirements in the securities regulation regime); Michael L. Siegel, Bringing Coherence to Mens 
Rea Analysis for Securities-Related Offenses, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 1563, 1567 (noting that the dif-
ference between civil and criminal punishments for securities law violations hinges on the defini-
tion of willfulness). 
 118 See Johnson & Millon, supra note 2, at 1895; (pointing to the centrality of disclosure to all 
American securities regulation); Daniel M. Gallagher, The Importance of the SEC Disclosure 
Regime, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (July 13, 2013), https://corpgov.
law.harvard.edu/2013/07/16/the-importance-of-the-sec-disclosure-regime/ [https://perma.cc/W34X-
GTCW] (noting that the SEC’s mission centers on disclosure). 
 119 See, e.g., Aaron, 446 U.S. at 697 (noting that negligence suffices for violations of Section 
17(a)(2) of the Securities Act). 
 120 See Buell, supra note 30, at 544 (observing that the DOJ can bring criminal charges with 
regard to willful conduct); Siegel, supra note 117, at 1567 (noting that the difference between civil 
and criminal punishments for securities law violations hinges on the definition of willfulness); 
Mary Jo White, Chair, All-Encompassing Enforcement: The Robust Use of Civil and Criminal 
Actions to Police the Markets, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Mar. 31, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/
news/speech/2014-spch033114mjw [https://perma.cc/A9NM-LN83] (“[E]ssentially any violation 
of the federal securities laws and regulations can be a criminal violation if done willfully, that is, 
with intent to violate the law.”). 
 121 See Johnson & Millon, supra note 2, at 1895 (noting that the entire securities regulation 
regime rests on disclosure); Gallagher, supra note 118 (observing that disclosure lies at the heart 
of what the SEC does). In addition, the limited nature of the Williams Act raises further questions 
about whether Congress intended to reach negligent conduct. See Johnson & Millon, supra note 2, 
at 1895 (noting that Congress only “modestly amended” the securities regulation regime with the 
Williams Act). But see Meredith M. Brown, The Scope of the Williams Act and Its 1970 Amend-
ments, 26 BUS. L. 1637, 1647–48 (1971) (arguing that the SEC wished for a broad reading of the 
Williams Act). Beyond that, a good deal of authority establishes that Section 14(e) should be read 
to require a showing of scienter, not negligence. See Sautter, supra note 2, at 365 (noting that 
Section 14(e) meant to cover gaps left by Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5); S.J. 
Grossman & O.D. Hart, Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids, 35 J. FIN. 323, 326 (1980) (noting 
that Section 14(e) aims to prevent fraudulent non-disclosure). 
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Furthermore, even if the Varjabedian analysis is correct that the text of 
Section 14(e) suggests a requirement of negligence, courts often resolve 
statutory ambiguities by looking to the purpose underlying a given stat-
ute.122 Though Section 14(e) mandates the disclosure of information related 
to tender offers, it does not invite courts to judge the fairness of these trans-
actions.123 That is to say, the omission of one document by the Emulex 
board does not upend settled assumptions about shareholders having the 
freedom and autonomy to accept or reject any tender offer before them.124 
Lastly, firms in the one of the world’s largest centers of economic activity 
require uniformity in legal standards and adherence to precedent to plan 
their affairs with certainty inside and outside the Ninth Circuit.125 After all, 
the likes of Amazon, Alphabet, Apple, Boeing, Disney, Facebook, Intel, Mi-
crosoft, and Starbucks call the Ninth Circuit home.126 Having one set of 
rules apply to their business inside the Ninth Circuit and another set of rules 
apply to their business outside the Ninth Circuit is hardly ideal.127 In addi-
tion, Varjabedian disrupted the settled understanding of Section 14(e), 
thereby making it more difficult for firms to rely on precedent to plan with 
certainty.128 
                                                                                                                           
 122 See United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543–44 (1940) (pointing out that 
the Court looks to the purpose of the statute rather the plain language when using the latter as a 
guide produces absurd results); Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting 
Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 847 (1992) (arguing that courts should pay attention to legisla-
tive intent, as the law serves pragmatic ends). But see ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, 
READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 343 (1st ed. 2012) (urging judges not to 
follow their beliefs about the purpose of a statute, as doing so may lead to uncertainty and confu-
sion). 
 123 Schreiber, 472 U.S. at 11–12 (“Nowhere in the legislative history is there the slightest 
suggestion that § 14(e) serves any purpose other than disclosure, or that the term ‘manipulative’ 
should be read as an invitation to the courts to oversee the substantive fairness of tender offers; the 
quality of any offer is a matter for the marketplace.”). 
 124 See id. (making clear that courts should leave decisions about the fairness of tender offers 
to the marketplace). 
 125 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992) (“Liberty finds no 
refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt.”). 
 126 Makeda Easter, The New Fortune 500 List Is Out. These California Companies Made the 
Cut, L.A. TIMES (June 7, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-fortune-500-california-2017
0607-story.html [https://perma.cc/ZC24-SRNJ]; CHOOSE WASH.: WASH. ST. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 
http://choosewashingtonstate.com/ [https://perma.cc/E86R-QXPG]. 
 127 Compare SEC v. Ginsburg, 362 F.3d 1292, 1297 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that violations 
of Section 14(e) require a showing of scienter), and Adams, 623 F.2d at 431 (same), with Var-
jabedian, 888 F.3d at 407 (ruling that violations of Section 14(e) require only a showing of negli-
gence).  
 128 See Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 844 (underscoring the importance of adhering to 
precedent). 
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CONCLUSION 
In Varjabedian, the Ninth Circuit ascribed too much importance to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Aaron. In doing so, it shed light on how earlier 
courts could have construed similar language in a similar fashion. This ap-
proach, however, conflicts with the Court’s construction of Section 14(e) 
and Rule 10b-5 as well as the decisions of five other circuits. Furthermore, 
although Section 14(e) mandates the disclosure of information related to 
tender offers, it does not invite courts to judge the fairness of these transac-
tions. That is to say, the omission of one document by the Emulex board 
does not upend settled assumptions about shareholders having the freedom 
and autonomy to accept or reject any tender offer before them. When cou-
pled with the fact that such companies as Amazon, Apple, Boeing, Disney, 
Facebook, Google, Intel, and Starbucks call the Ninth Circuit home, uni-
formity in legal standards and adherence to precedent in the securities law 
domain matter even more. Therefore, when the Supreme Court rules on Var-
jabedian, it should follow its own precedent, return uniformity in legal 
standards to the nation, and hold that Section 14(e) requires a showing of 
scienter. 
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